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ABSTRACT 
Increased levels of automation at modern workplaces in 
industry, business, and transportation generally increase 
safety and productivity but sometimes negatively impact 
the ability to withstand unexpected adverse events. A side 
effect of such high levels of automation can result in 
humans performing fewer macrocognitive functions which 
can lead to reduced adaptability. In this paper we address 
this issue by identifying an integrative psychological 
framework to guide the design of technological and non-
technological interventions for increased system resilience. 
The framework is derived from approaches in cognitive 
psychology, human factors, and neurobiology and focuses 
on the facilitation of positive appraisal processes. We 
present this framework to solicit feedback and to 
subsequently apply it to the design of resilient systems in 
advanced manufacturing and automated driving. 
Author Keywords 
System resilience; psychological framework; appraisal 
theory; automation; design guidance; human factors. 
ACM Classification Keywords 
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INTRODUCTION 
Trends in modern working environments such as industrial 
manufacturing, business, aviation, and in the automotive 
domain show increasing levels of automation that have 
been changing and partly replacing human tasks. This 
applies not only to manual tasks, but also to information 
tasks. The high levels of automation have often increased 
safety and productivity by allowing to operate closer and 
more reliably to a system’s optimal performance. For 
example, aircraft flight management systems can fly 
optimized energy efficient profiles that reduce the burning 
of fuel over extended flight durations. Also, automated 
flight planning software finds the most optimal flight path 
considering winds and weather conditions. International 
aviation innovation programs use automation to further 
increase predictability and efficiency of flights beyond what 
pilots and controllers can achieve through manual 
interaction ([1] and [2]). In the automotive domain, 
automated driving is intended to increase fuel efficiency, 
safety, and comfort [3].  
These performance increases however are sometimes offset 
by decreases in system resilience. Resilience is the ability to 
prepare and plan for, absorb or mitigate, recover from, or 
more successfully adapt to actual or potential adverse 
events [4]. According to, Holling ([5]), increasing a 
system’s ability to operate near a narrow optimum range 
may actually decrease its ability to recover from non-
nominal adverse events that are further away from that 
optimality.  
For examples, business information systems (BIS) represent 
information automation intended to generate performance 
improvements through enterprise process standardization 
[6]. They play a critical role in the daily operation of such 
enterprises to timely deliver business-relevant information 
to decision makers [7].  Such automation systems require 
narrow and clearly defined user interactions, thereby 
creating increased error opportunities under adverse 
conditions if appropriate interaction protocols have only 
been defined for non-adverse conditions. As consequence, 
managerial decisions can be faulty and lead to 
organizational crises. Such risks have been investigated, for 
example, by [8] for a large-scale enterprise. 
Decreases in system resilience as results of automation have 
also been observed in aviation where pilots of highly 
automated flight decks sometimes report that the automated 
functions work in unexpected ways, that they are 
sometimes unsure about whether and when to terminate 
automation, and that they sometimes experience reduced 
levels of situation awareness [9]. In July 2013, the pilots of 
flight Asiana 214 on their approach to San Francisco 
International Airport missed to manage the aircraft’s speed, 
erroneously assuming that flight deck automation was 
controlling the air speed [10]. The aircraft stalled as result 
and crashed on the runway. Similarly, pilots on board of Air 
France Flight 447 in June 2016 were unable to recover from 
a momentary disengagement of the autopilot due to failures 
of the sensed air speed and to manually stabilize the flight. 
They subsequently crashed into the sea [11].  
Similarly, supplier delivery networks that involve complex 
process and information automation are highly sensitive to 
the impact of adverse events. For example, Boeing 
experienced in 1997 an estimated loss of $ 2.6 billion due to 
supplier delivery failure of critical parts [12]. Similarly, the 
manufacturing domain with complex automation is 
sensitivity to adverse events. For example, a fire that 
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erupted at a plant of Philips in New Mexico in 2001 caused 
losses of sales of high-margin computer chips of a value up 
to $40 million [13].    
One reason why in some cases increased levels of 
automation and information management may decrease a 
systems’ resilience has been attributed to a decrease in 
humans’ macrocognitive functions [14]. Macrocognitive 
functions consist of cycles of problem detection, sense-
making, replanning, deciding, and coordinating. The 
execution of such functions allows humans to take control 
under adverse events. For example, Captain Sullenberger 
landed an Airbus 320 on the Hudson river in January 2009 
after a flock of geese that had been ingested in the jet 
engines, disabling both engines soon after liftoff [15]. The 
captain and his crew were able to land the airplane on a 
river. 
On the other hand, humans not only save failing systems, 
sometimes their decisions make things worse. Inherent 
limitations in our cognitive abilities can stand in the way of 
controlling complex systems, like airplanes, organizations, 
or large scale weather event recoveries. [16] investigated 
human responses of recovery after major weather events 
where  they  report observing the impact of “cognitive 
framing”: humans are influenced by how information is 
presented rather than its content (see e.g. [17] and [18]). 
How could automation be designed that increases 
productivity and safety but also increases their resilience? 
One way consists of building additional safeguards into 
systems. For example, production systems can mitigate the 
effects of machine disruptions by designing redundant and 
flexible functionalities [19]. In office environments, BIS 
have to be designed such that unforeseen conditions can be 
detected and do not lead to system failures, such as by 
providing user interfaces that reduce error opportunities and 
by guiding users how to resolve errors once they have 
occurred [6]. However, building safeguards into systems 
can be expensive and in the end not address all previously 
unforeseen conditions. Therefore we explore alternative 
ways to increase system resilience, that is by setting 
interventions that enable humans intrinsic resilience 
capabilities. 
Intervening for Resilience 
Resilience engineering addresses the question how systems 
can be made more resilient; “When we see things go right 
under difficult circumstances, we’ve found that it’s mostly 
because of people’s adaptive capacity—their ability to 
recognize, absorb, and adapt to changes and disruptions—
some of which may even fall outside of what the system has 
been trained or designed to do” [20]. Resilience 
engineering postulates four cornerstones that help 
organizations and humans to increase system resilience 
[20]: 
 Knowing what to look for, ie. to identify signs of crisis 
before they occur 
 Knowing what to do, i.e. to respond to the signs of crisis 
in appropriate ways 
 Knowing what to expect, i.e. how to anticipate future 
crises 
 Knowing what has happened, i.e. to learn from 
experience to strengthen resilience on these four 
dimensions 
The four cornerstones for resilient systems also point to the 
importance of human macrocognitive functions ([14]) but it 
remains unclear how interventions or humans themselves 
can enable them. In the psychological and neurobiological 
domains, [21] have proposed a unified theoretical 
framework for the study of general resilience. The “Positive 
Appraisal Style Theory of Resilience (PASTOR)” 
framework postulates that positive appraisal style, positive 
reappraisal, and interference inhibition are the key 
mechanisms leading to resilient behavior and that they 
mediate the effects of other resilience factors. Positive 
appraisal styles consist of a generalized tendency to 
appraise potentially aversive stimuli in a non-negative 
fashion. Positive reappraisals occur if, after initial negative 
appraisals of a situation, reappraisal processes ultimately 
allow for positive appraisal outcomes. Active inhibition 
processes allow positive appraisals to persist in the presence 
of possible concurrent negative appraisals that can be 
prevalent in strongly aversive situations.  
To further understand what contributes to positive appraisal 
processes, [21] refers to a more detailed theory of cognitive 
appraisal processes, specifically, the “Sequential Check 
Theory of Emotion Differentiation” by [22] which 
differentiates four appraisal assessment strategies that allow 
humans to positively adapt to situations:  
 Detect the relevance of a crisis signal 
 Assess its implications,  
 Determine coping potential, and  
 Check for its normative significance, ie. against internal 
and external standards and ideals.  
Integrating the approaches of [20], [21], and [22] allows us 
to postulate a psychological framework for designing 
technological and non-technological interventions to 
increase  (ecological) systems resilience. 
 
FRAMEWORK OF INTERVENTIONS TO INCREASE 
SYSTEM RESILIENCE 
The fundamental assumption of the framework is that 
enabling positive appraisal processes are key to initiate the 
needed controls to keep a system functioning under adverse 
conditions. The framework consists of five components, 
labeled A to E in Figure 1 that enable resilient responses to 
a sign of crisis. Component A describes the precursors for 
resilience including individual, environmental and social 
aspects that need to be in place prior to a sign of crisis. 
Once a sign of crisis has surfaced, appraisal processes 
(component B) lead to an adaptive response, or if not, 
component C describes the reappraisal processes that would 
revert initially negative appraisals to eventually positive 
appraisals. Once positive appraisals have been reached, a 
resilience increasing response can be given. Component D 
describes the inhibition of negative appraisal processes that 
may invert the initial positive appraisal processes. 
Component E finally describes how people, organizations 
and systems can hold the learned resilience knowledge and 
expertise. The framework of resilience combines three 
different approaches; [21] informed components A., C., D., 
and to some extent B., [22] informed B. in more detail, and 
[20] informed E. 
 
Figure 1 Framework to Increase System Resilience through 
Facilitation of Appraisal Processes 
  
A. Precursors for Resilience 
Multiple precursors for resilience can be found in 
psychological, environmental, social, and biological 
preconditions [23]  that facilitate people’s engagement in 
positive appraisal styles. [24] describes the concept of 
learned helplessness that explains why people sometimes 
lose their ability to control a situation and therefore exhibit 
a reduced likelihood of positive appraisals. [25] describes 
inter-individual differences in attributing external and 
internal control; for example, attributing rewards to external 
circumstances (e.g. “this was pure luck”) would decrease 
positive appraisals. Further, attitudes about individual self-
value have an impact on appraisals. For example, [26] 
describe the effect of brief, stealthy, and psychologically 
precise interventions that can increase the likelihood of 
students positively appraising their failures by helping them 
consider the impact of the situational context. On the 
biological level, age, gender, fatigue, and health can have 
an impact on positive appraisals. On the social level, 
support, cohesion, and level of social participation have an 
impact. Increased stress levels (e.g. induced through noise, 
reduced comfort, attentional demands, and distractions in 
the environment) have a detrimental impact on appraisal 
processes, see e.g. [27]. In addition, [28] postulates 
appropriate knowledge as a mediating factor for positive 
appraisals, such as attained via education, specialized 
training, or work experience.  
Interventions that facilitate such resilience precursors 
include education (e.g. “what is resilience”, “how do people 
differ”, “how can it be strengthened”), training (e.g. 
“practice engaging in positive adaptive response styles”), 
psychological support (e.g. through metareflective or 
psychotherapeutic strengthening of internal loci of control 
and reduced helplessness), organizational support, and 
social modeling (providing exemplary behavior for positive 
appraisals).  Most of these interventions are inherently non-
technological, though technological support options may 
exist (such as virtual support, courses, or social media). 
B. Appraisal Processes 
Once the first sign of crisis has surfaced, individuals may 
engage in a series of four types of appraisal processes, see 
[22]. The time interval between the first occurrence of a 
sign of crisis and the actual crisis may vary considerably. 
B.1. Detect signs of crisis 
To detect a sign of crisis, an individual needs to scan the 
environment and perform a novelty check. Detection 
depends on the degree of familiarity with the environment 
and its structural complexity, as well as the quality of the 
signal itself. The likelihood of further processing is then 
influenced by what [22] calls a pleasant / unpleasantness 
check. For example, the captain of the taking-off aircraft 
KLM 4805 on March 27th, 1977 in Tenerife, a highly 
trained pilot, ignored a clear sign of crisis that his flight 
engineer gave when he warned about another aircraft on the 
runway well prior to the subsequent crash. However, the 
captain of the B747 discregarded that information and 
pursued the takeoff [29]. 
Next a goal relevance check establishes whether a potential 
crisis signal impacts the goals of the observer. A goal-
discordant sign may be ignored. For example, the 
observation of a slight deviation in size of a manufactured 
good on the production line may not directly impact the 
worker who observes it but may have a significant impact 
further down the line [30]. Because the sign is not relevant 
to the worker who observes it, the sign may be ignored. 
 
Existing technological interventions that increase the 
likelihood of detecting signs of crisis are warning systems. 
For example, the Terrain Awareness Warning System 
(TAWS) warns pilots if they are in immediate danger of 
flying into the ground
 
[31]. Non-technological interventions 
could consist of “wise interventions” [32] that trigger 
specific psychological processes that modify and increase 
likelihood of crisis sign detection. Also, the reduction of 
distractions such as acoustic interference during highly 
stressful situations could increase the likelihood of 
detection. 
B.2. Understand the implications of signs of crises 
Once detected, the implications of the sign are assessed. Its 
causal attributes are checked (e.g. could the sign of crisis 
represent a false alarm or does it originate from a non-well-
intending individual) and the likely outcomes are assessed. 
For this check, contextual information about the situation is 
needed. Also, it needs to be assessed whether a crisis signal 
is conducive to one’s individual goal (e.g. the illuminated 
fuel reserve indicator light close to the travel destination 
would not be a severe crisis signal). An urgency check 
determines the immediacy with which an adaptive response 
may be required. Technological interventions that increase 
an operators’ situational awareness could help understand 
signs of crisis. For example, moving maps support pilots’ 
location awareness when taxiing on the airport surface or 
decision support tools or digital assistants can help assess 
the implications of signs of crisis.  
B.3. Understand the coping potential 
Coping potential is understood by performing a control 
check that determines to what degree a situation can be 
influenced at all (e.g. weather situations are not controllable 
but airplanes generally are) and a power check determines 
whether the individual has the needed abilities to address 
the sign of crisis (e.g. whether somebody has the 
knowledge to fly an airplane). Decision support tools could 
help understand an individual whether and how to cope 
with an event. If a crisis cannot be prevented, an adjustment 
check could lead an individual to decide to accept the 
consequences of the crisis. Also, information 
communication tools may allow individuals to contact 
experts to better understand or increase coping potential. 
B.4. Understand the normative significance 
If the outcomes of the positive appraisal processes are 
inconsistent with the individual’s own internal standards 
and social norms of the environment, a crisis intervention 
may not be executed despite the ability to do so. Social 
network technological could be used to facilitate such 
assessments or disseminate positive examples for resilient 
behavior. 
C. Reappraisal Processes 
If initial appraisal processes have not led to a positive 
appraisal, subsequent reappraisal processes may lead to 
different outcomes. Under the urgency of an initial crisis 
signal, high arousal levels can make it difficult to identify 
positive adaptive options. Also, crisis signals that do not fit 
into the expected system behavior or do not fit the prevalent 
social norms may be initially ignored and may need to be 
reappraised. At this time, new information may emerge to 
help the individual positively reappraise the situation. 
Reappraisal processes may become more likely if sufficient 
time between the first sign of the crisis and the actual crisis 
exists. The continued display of crisis urgency indicators as 
well as the display of positive coping options may serve as 
interventions to lead to positive reappraisals.  
D. Inhibition of Negative Appraisals 
Positive appraisals may over time discontinue and change 
to negative appraisals if environmental or individual 
conditions change, such as increased workload, stress, or 
physical or emotional exhaustion. The inhibition of 
negative appraisals is therefore intended to allow positive 
appraisals to persist. Technological interventions such as 
social communication of positive appraisal processes may 
“lock” individuals into their path and reduce the likelihood 
of inhibiting future negative appraisal processes. 
E. Resilience Learning 
Over the lifetime of a system, crises may continuously 
occur and therefore form opportunities to learn and transmit 
knowledge to later generations about how crises can be 
effectively handled, thereby increasing the resilience of the 
overall system. For example, the appropriate farming 
practices within a given environment have developed over 
time to reduce undesired erosions or soil-depletion and have 
been carried between generations. Transmission of such 
knowledge increases overall system resilience and requires 
transmission processes [33] that could be facilitated through 
digital assistance or knowledge management tools. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we have proposed an integrated psychological 
framework for designing interventions to increase system 
resilience. Our next steps will consist of validating this 
framework by deriving specific hypotheses that 
differentiate the implications from other frameworks. 
Second, we plan to test the framework by deriving 
technological and non-technological intervention strategies 
in two different domains, automated driving and advanced 
manufacturing and evaluate their impact on system 
resilience. 
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